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Welcoming Words

Pax et Bellum Journal is a publication of articles that seek to explore and analyze issues and debates in the field of peace and conflict. Based at Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Pax et Bellum is created and composed by students.

We begin with a piece from Nina Lazarczyk, which considers why armed groups resort to sexual violence. Taking the case of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 2003-2009, she evaluates the utility of the theory of combat socialization against that of sexual violence as a military strategy. In doing so, the paper seeks to determine which theory is consistent with the facts on the ground.

Jamie LeSueur follows with an intriguing exploration of moral hazard as it relates to conflict. He investigates the 2011 Libyan Uprising to question whether the doctrine of R2P, or Responsibility to Protect, may have acted as an 'insurance policy' that perversely incentivized the rebels to challenge the state despite facing almost insurmountable odds.

Finally, Zodiac Maslin examines The International Security Assistance Force's use of reconstruction and development projects as a means of achieving stability in Afghanistan. Comparing the approach taken by New Zealand in Bamyan and Norway in Faryab, the article investigates whether the level of local control that provincial governments held over the implementation of the projects affected the stability of that area.

From small beginnings we hope that Pax et Bellum Journal will grow with each new issue, gathering contributions from students around the world. To that end, welcome to Issue Two.

The Editorial Team

Why do armed groups resort to sexual violence?

The Case of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003 – 2009

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Abstract

This paper attempts to assess the explanatory power of two theories explaining the phenomenon of sexual violence in conflict, the combatant socialization argument and rape as a military strategy. The single case study analysis based on the example of the 14th Brigade, belonging to the Congolese national army and responsible for the crimes of sexual violence in 2003-2009, sheds new light on the puzzle 'Why do armed groups resort to sexual violence?' The first theory partially confirms that groups with low social cohesion are more prone to the perpetration of rape, especially gang rape. However, the study does not confirm that the perpetration of rape increases a sense of unity between the soldiers. The second theory fails to explain rape in Congo as a strategy of war since soldiers are not given orders to rape.

Introduction

The occurrence of sexual violence in armed conflicts has been distinguished as a part of the larger phenomenon of civilian targeting in peace and conflict research. The scholars investigate and try to understand the motivations of combatant groups who resort to rape. The literature comprises of many theories explaining sexual violence in conflict. This paper will assess the explanatory power of two of those theories, the combatant socialization argument and rape as a military strategy.

The theory of combatant socialization argues that armed groups with low social cohesion are more willing to commit rape, as it creates bonding mechanisms among its members (Card 1996; Wood 2006a). These loosely tied groups resort more often to gang rape, which lets them engage in a common activity and demonstrate their sexual capabilities in front of fellow soldiers. The perpetration of gang rape is a source of camaraderie and entertainment, as well as social cohesion (Hauffe and Porter 2009).

Another theory explains the phenomenon of rape as a strategy of war according to which rape is a systematic, indiscriminate, widespread and brutal tactic executed by combatants against civilians in order to achieve strategic objectives of war (Gottschall 2004; Isikozlu and Millard 2010). The wartime rape is said to be a systematic and coherent weapon used to subdue, humiliate and inflict physical, as well as psychological, harm on the population (Wood 2006; Wood 2009).

By applying these two theories of the occurrence of sexual violence in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the period from 2003 to 2009 the paper will attempt to answer the research question 'Why do armed groups resort to sexual violence?' This study will explain the motivations behind the perpetration of the sexual violence by the Congolese national army, Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). The eastern part of DRC, North and South Kivu, is the most fragile and violent region due to the presence of valuable mineral

resources and numerous armed groups. Members of these armed groups, including the Congolese national army, have committed acts of sexual violence.

In order to discuss the causes of mass scale sexual violence, this paper will first present the theories related to wartime rape. Second, it will propose the research design as well as the sources. Third, it will discuss the case study and provide the analysis. And, finally, it will draw conclusions from the arguments presented.

Theories of Sexual Violence in Conflict

Combatant Socialization Theory

Contrary to the notion that combatants perpetrate sexual violence because of sexual desire, the combatant socialization theory holds that wartime rape increases group cohesion among members of an armed group (Card 1996). This phenomenon was studied already on the case of combatants in World War II (Wood 2009). Card notes that the wartime rape does not play a role of binding women to men, but forming ties between perpetrators, a mechanism she calls a “bonding agent” (Card 1996, 7).

According to the research, collective rape can produce a feeling of camaraderie and is a source of entertainment during, as well as, after the act (Bijleveld et al. 2007; Hauffe and Porter 2009). The perpetrators interact with each other demonstrating their sexual abilities as a public performance. Hauffe and Porter (2009) tell a difference between lone and group rapists. Lone rapists commit rape to satisfy their sexual drive, while group assailants demonstrate their behavior in front of others with the intention to boost their personal esteem through the expression of violence. Group assailants are more likely to express hostility towards rape victims and resort to higher levels of violence than lone rapists.

Dara Cohen (2013) claims that combatant groups with low levels of social cohesion are more likely to commit rape, especially gang rape, which occurs more often during war than peacetime due to its public nature. Participation in collective sexual assault builds up the unity among group members through the communication of values of virility and power. In her research, Cohen focuses mainly on the recruitment mechanism, arguing that armed groups, who use force or coercion to enlist their members, display low levels of social cohesion. Thus, this paper is based on the assumption that internally weak groups are more likely to commit wartime rape.

H1: Armed groups with low level of social cohesion are more likely to commit wartime rape.

Sexual Violence as a Strategy of War

Many scholars maintain that wartime rape is not a direct consequence of the widespread impunity in armed conflicts, but is a part of a deliberate systematic strategy targeting civilians in order to debilitate, subdue, and humiliate the population (Gottschall 2004; Pratt and Werchick 2004; Farr 2009; Isikozlu and Millard 2010). After sexual atrocities were committed during the wars in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, mass-scale sexual violence attracted the attention of analysts to the point that they acknowledged wartime rape as a separate war tactic used next to “bombs, bullets, or propaganda” (Gottschall 2004, 131).

Sexual violence perpetrated against civilians aims to weaken solidarity and destroy the social identity (Card 1996; Diken 2005). Wartime rape can be also used as a tool in ethnic wars to render an

area ethnically homogenous (Diken 2005), such as in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In countries, such as Liberia, Uganda, and Sierra Leone, wartime rape has neither been part of an ethnic conflict, nor a by-product of impunity reigning during civil wars, but rather an element of a systematic and coherent military tactic (Wood 2006a; Diken 2005).

Finally, some researchers emphasize the role of sexual violence in armed conflicts as a means to achieve further war objectives (Pratt and Werchick 2004; Meger 2010; Isikozlu and Millard 2010). They claim that armed groups attack civilians in order to bring chaos in a region, which facilitates access to natural resources or local goods.

Many scholars explicitly refer to wartime rape as a strategy or a weapon of war (Albarracin, Banholzer, and Schneider 2011; Brown 2011; Maedl 2011; Pratt and Werchick 2004). They mainly refer to the consequences of widespread sexual violence, mass-scale perpetration of gang rape, the brutality of rapes, the victimization of all women regardless of age or ethnic origin and male rape (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2010). The scale and cruelty of rape imply that mainly armed groups with a clear chain of command would be able to perpetrate such high levels of sexual violence (Isikozlu and Millard 2010).

However, some researchers admit that it is difficult to assess whether the occurrence of wartime rape constitutes an element of an organized plan because usually there is not enough evidence that the soldiers were given direct orders to rape (Isikozlu and Millard 2010; Wood 2006a). Isikozlu and Millard write that although the assailants are not always directly ordered to rape, the sexual violence is organized and far-reaching, so it displays features of a military tactic. Wood writes about a military strategy even when the rape is only condoned by commanders. She emphasizes the role of the effectiveness of an armed group's command and its control structure.

Since it is difficult to objectively acquire information about whether sexual violence is condoned by commanders, this study will focus on the examination of the structure and efficiency of the chain of command. The existence of a clear chain of command should facilitate tracking whether or not an occurrence of sexual violence was a part of an official tactic. However, a lack of a clear chain of command may imply less control over individual military units and thus, the inability to form a cohesive military strategy, which may include the use of sexual violence as a tactic. Therefore, this study will be derived from the assumption that wartime rape is a military strategy when soldiers are given orders to rape.

H2: Armed groups with a clear chain of command are more likely to commit wartime rape.

Research Design

The occurrence of sexual violence in eastern DRC perpetrated by the Congolese national army, Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), in the period from 2003 to 2009 is the dependent variable. FARDC was established in 2003 through a process of mixing all the former rebel groups and government forces. Terms such as army, armed group, government forces, soldiers, or combatants are related to FARDC or its members. Since the FARDC troops are numerous and constantly undergo many structural changes, it is not possible to analyze the composition of all FARDC units. Therefore, the analysis will concern the condition of the 14th Brigade of FARDC in the 8th and 10th military region, which exemplifies the situation in the whole army (Human Rights Watch 2009).

Sexual violence in this paper is synonymous with rape which is “the coerced (under physical force or threat of a physical force against the victim or a third person) penetration of the anus or

vagina by the penis or another object, or the mouth by the penis” (Wood 2006, p. 308). The study focuses on the period from 2006 to 2009 covering the period of existence of the 14th Brigade, which as a part of the Congolese army was supposed to protect the Congolese state and its population. However, it has been one of the main perpetrators of sexual violence. The time frame is limited to 2009, when the 14th Brigade was disintegrated and FARDC composition changed significantly due to the integration of *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* (CNDP) into its structure, the opposition rebel group so far.

Since it is difficult to talk about the recruitment mechanism into the Congolese army (FARDC) in 2003, as it was formed on the basis of various former combatant groups, this study will focus on the internal structure of FARDC to analyze whether the low social cohesion could have possibly increased the perpetration of sexual violence by FARDC soldiers. The internal structure of the FARDC is the independent variable used to discuss the combatant socialization theory. The internal structure means the composition of newly created brigades. It is necessary to examine which former combatant and militia groups were incorporated into the new army and what the interactions were between them so as to assess its social cohesion. The goal is to assess whether the strength of the FARDC structure had an impact on the patterns of sexual violence perpetrated by the national army. The association of low social cohesion with high levels of sexual violence will therefore support hypothesis I.

Another independent variable will be the chain of command, which will be used to examine whether rape is a systematic tactic ordered by commanders. The chain of command means the hierarchy within which authority, power, and orders are delegated from the top leaders to the individual soldiers in the army. This study will investigate whether individual soldiers were given orders to rape, and if they did, from which level in the chain of command those orders came from. If the soldiers had been ordered to rape, this evidence would provide support for hypothesis II.

It should be noted that this paper does not explain all patterns of sexual violence in the DRC in a given period, since it is a very complex phenomenon encompassing a variety of groups and individuals. Various approaches such as economic or ethnic factors, the presence of mineral resources as well as reigning impunity can affect the high rates of sexual violence in the DRC.

Sources

This research focuses on the conflict mapping reports on sexual violence in the DRC produced by Human Rights Watch. Additional information is drawn from research papers and journal articles, such as *The Journal of Modern African Studies* or *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, which include interviews with rape perpetrators as well as statistics on the rates of sexual violence. It is important to note that the data on the number of rape victims and rape perpetrators may be incomplete, since many cases of sexual violence remain unreported.

It is difficult to clearly assess how the lack of the data on the exact number of rape victims and rapists could affect this analysis. If the incompleteness of the data is random, then problems of reliability are introduced. However, if the missing data leaves out a specific area or some military unit due to the inaccessibility of the conflict zone, then the results may be biased, which undermines the validity of the conducted research. Therefore, this paper seeks to test the selected theories on sexual violence specifically in relation to the 14th Brigade of the Congolese army. Thus, it would be misleading to apply the findings of this analysis to the phenomenon of the sexual violence in the context of the whole Congolese state or any other context.

Case Study of the 14th Brigade of FARDC

Introduction to the Case Study

In 2003, a peace treaty officially ended the war initiated in Congo in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and set up a transitional government with a new national army (FARDC). The army was formed through a process of mixing all former rebel groups and government forces. The soldiers were given forty-five days of training and were deployed in a region where they had not served before (Human Rights Watch 2007).

At the border regions of North and South Kivu, the Congolese army, Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) and the militia group Mai-Mai, exacerbated by ethnic tensions, fought each other over valuable mineral resources (Isikozlu and Millard 2010). All the parties were responsible for sexual violence. The national army that emerged following the peace treaty became one of the main perpetrators of rape from 2003 to 2009 (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2010; Human Rights Watch 2009).

Analysis of the Combatant Socialization Theory

The 14th Brigade was established in 2006 through a process of mixing the combatants from Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Goma (RCD-Goma), Mai-Mai and government forces - three armed groups previously fighting each other. RCD-Goma, one of the main rebel groups supported by the Rwandan state, fought against government forces, whereas Mai-Mai fought against RCD-Goma (Human Rights Watch 2009).

Apart from the tensions between former armed groups, there were also divisions along ethnic lines. The 14th Brigade encompassed four battalions in which the Congolese Hutus and Tutsis were separated from others. However, many Congolese Hutus had positions in command, which created discontent among soldiers from other ethnic groups while Hutu members did not want to accept a non-Hutu commander above them in rank. In addition, due to several replacements in the brigade and integration of new rebels from other armed groups, the composition of the 14th Brigade was constantly changing from 2006 until 2009 (Human Rights Watch 2009).

The case of the 14th Brigade typifies the continual reorganizations of the FARDC troops, which stemmed from the lack of coherence among soldiers at the group unit level (Human Rights Watch 2009). The essential goal of the integration, which was to eliminate the divisions between ethnic and former rebel groups, failed in 2007 (Spittaels and Hilgert 2008). This failure implies that the perpetration of sexual violence by combatants did not enhance the cohesion of soldiers at the military unit level.

During four consecutive years the members of the 14th Brigade committed many acts of sexual violence, including gang rape (Human Rights Watch 2009; Spittaels and Hilgert 2008). The analysis of the evolution it underwent suggests that the weak group cohesion could have been one of the factors leading to the increased perpetration of sexual violence. The groups with low cohesion may have lacked a sense of group responsibility and responsiveness to their commanders. Thus, they were more likely to commit rape, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. This evidence does not contradict the hypothesis; however, it does not fully confirm it either. In order to confirm the hypothesis the analysis would have to examine whether the same levels of cohesion and rape coincide, which would entail some type of comparison over time. However, due to the lack of adequate data such an analysis is not possible to conduct.

Analysis of the Theory of Sexual Violence as a Strategy of War

In the period from 2006 to 2009 the top leadership of the 14th Brigade changed four times, and every time it occurred, many soldiers did not follow orders given by the new commander, but remained loyal to the previous one. Due to the continual of integration, the troops were replaced several times in the regions within boundaries of another military region. When the soldiers targeted civilians and committed human rights abuses, the army headquarters could not decide which commanders were responsible (Human Rights Watch 2009).

In addition, the soldiers did not carry out the orders given by the commander of the 10th military region, General Masunzu, but instead rebelled against him. General Masunzu publicly admitted that the 10th military region did not have any control over the 14th Brigade. However, General Mayala, the head of the 8th military region, claimed that the 10th military region has administrative duties towards the 14th Brigade, whereas his military region was responsible for operational activities. Although Mayala stated that he was responsible for the activities of the soldiers from the 14th Brigade, he did not condone the crimes committed by them (Human Rights Watch 2009). This information suggests that one of the reasons why the soldiers of the 14th Brigade perpetrated large-scale sexual violence was the lack of clear chain of command and the failure to respond to human rights abuses by army leaders.

The case of the 14th Brigade illustrates the general situation concerning FARDC forces whose integration process failed, as reflected in the multiple and parallel chains of command (Baaz and Stern 2009). In addition, Baaz and Stern (2009) point out that the FARDC did not possess the mechanisms of identification and control of either soldiers or commanders who committed severe crimes against civilians. The interviews carried out with FARDC soldiers confirm that they were never given orders to rape (Albarracin, Banholzer, and Schneider 2011). The analysts admit that FARDC forces are extremely undisciplined, but they take into consideration the possibility that the information about the real character of rapes cannot easily be assessed from interviews with rape perpetrators.

The case analysis demonstrates that FARDC forces lacked a clear chain of command. Thus, it is not possible to talk about wartime rape in the DRC in terms of a systematic military tactic ordered by the commanders.

Comparison of Theories

Neither theory provides a complete understanding of the causes of high levels of sexual violence perpetrated by FARDC since the government forces had both loosely tied internal structures and a dysfunctional chain of command. The analysis reveals that the coherence of the armed groups was low before and after integration, which led to both the creation and disintegration of the 14th Brigade. The evidence does not contradict the hypothesis that groups with low level of cohesion are more likely to commit wartime rape, however, it does not confirm it either. In order to clarify the results of this analysis, it would be interesting to test whether group coherence increased after the perpetration of sexual violence, although this would reverse causality. Looking at the relationship between group cohesion and sexual violence from this perspective, one could assume that the failed integration was a result of low social cohesion, thus sexual violence did not improve the cohesion of military units. Nevertheless, sexual violence could still be used with the purpose of enhancing it. Furthermore, one could perhaps even suspect that the context of failed integration could provide ideal conditions for sexual violence to increase, according to the com-

batant socialization argument. Following this line of reasoning, rape may be seen as an inadvertent consequence of low social cohesion. The fact that soldiers were not explicitly given orders to rape gives support to this finding.

The theory of wartime sexual violence according to the second hypothesis related to a clear chain of command is not valid in the case of the 14th Brigade. Nevertheless, the lack of a clear chain of command in the 14th Brigade does not immediately imply that wartime rape cannot be a systematic strategy in other cases. As mentioned in the theory section, the fact that commanders condone sexual violence could be enough to explain large-scale occurrences of sexual violence displaying features of a tactic. In the case of the 14th Brigade the continuous reorganization of the military units led to internal chaos. The soldiers followed orders of previous commanders instead of following the instructions of new commanders.

Both theories fail to fully explain acts of sexual violence committed by the FARDC. Instead, this case study provides support for the argument that sexual violence perpetrated by FARDC can be partially the result of the indiscipline and impunity within armed units.

Alternative Explanations and Limitations

One of the most common explanations of wartime rape is the opportunism of war, which stems from the failure of the state. The lack of judicial control and legal punishment can lead to the destruction of social norms and constraints creating a sense of impunity. Under such conditions, when men know that they will not be held responsible for committing crimes, they are more willing to fulfill their sexual desires or release sexual tension. Therefore, during wartime men are more likely to commit rape due to the lack of any constraints (Goldstein 2001). Wood (2006) notes that not all wars display high rates of sexual violence. For example, the conflicts in Sri Lanka or El Salvador witnessed low levels of sexual violence. Therefore, some researchers claim that the sociocultural context of gender inequality is relevant for the occurrence of sexual violence (Meger 2010; Baaz and Stern 2009; Skjelsbaek 2001). Baaz and Stern (2009) analyze how FARDC soldiers understand the perpetration of sexual violence. The FARDC members distinguish between two types of rape, 'lust' rape and 'evil' rape. The first type is driven by a sexual desire, whereas the second type of rape is a way of releasing aggression. Following this path, Meger (2010) focuses on the perception of masculinity and femininity by the Congolese soldiers and concludes that rape as a symbolic tool of power let men express their sexual capabilities and fulfill social expectations. It is also emphasized that individual rapes were present in the DRC before the outbreak of war and were tolerated by society as a potential way to enforce marriage.

Since sexual violence in the Congo is a very complex phenomenon, covering various types of sexual violence and perpetrators, it is not possible to explain it only with the use of two theories. It should be noted that the motivations for rape can differ depending on the level of analysis. Individual motivations of soldiers can differ from those at the top of the leadership. Finally, the data on sexual violence and soldiers' motivations is hard to obtain, because many crimes go unregistered and perpetrators can hide incriminating facts. Additionally, this empirical analysis relies heavily on the Human Rights Watch report, which might be disproportional for the examination of the theories. However, the materials published by Human Rights Watch, which is a renowned international organization, are found credible and often constitute the main or the only source of data. Such a data limitation may cast doubts on the results of the conducted analysis posing a problem of validity. Since the data is retrieved mainly from a conflicted area, which is nonetheless

accessible to NGO activities, it may imply that the situation there is less severe than in other parts of eastern DRC, where international organizations cannot reach.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed two theories to explain the perpetration of widespread sexual violence in the DRC by the Congolese national army. First, the combatant socialization argument explains that groups with low levels of social cohesion will more often perpetrate sexual violence, especially gang rape, which lets them strengthen ties among group members. Second, the theory of rape as a war strategy argues that mass-scale brutal sexual violence targeting civilians is an element of a systematic, coherent, and planned military tactic. Thus, the hypothesis was that armed groups with a clear chain of command are more likely to commit wartime rape.

The theories have been tested on the case of the perpetration of sexual violence by the National Congolese Army (FARDC) in the region of North and South Kivu in the period from 2003 to 2009. The army, formed through a process of integrating various former armed groups, has a very loosely tied structure and lacks a clear chain of command. Therefore, the first theory is partially confirmed in that groups with low social cohesion are more prone to the perpetration of rape, especially gang rape. However, the case study does not confirm that the perpetration of rape boosts a sense of unity between soldiers, since the integration process did not manage to integrate FARDC members at the level of military units. The second theory fails to explain rape in the DRC as a strategy of war, because the research shows that there were many different and parallel chains of command and soldiers were not given orders to rape. None of the theories have complete explanatory power.

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Perverse Incentives: The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention in the 2011 Libyan Uprising

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Abstract

Humanitarian intervention (HI), operationalized through the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), was, at first glance, the answer to the question of how the international community would uphold the principles of the UN Charter in states that were purposefully targeting their own citizens. However, critics have argued that, despite its good intentions, R2P can bring about a level of violence that would have otherwise not occurred. This is because HI generates incentives that encourage rebel groups to pursue violent insurrection; the “Moral Hazard” (MH) of HI. In this paper, MH is examined within the case of the 2011 Uprising in Libya and applied to the National Liberation Army (NLA). In this paper, I argue that MH was present in Libya given that: 1) the rebels initiated the Uprising despite an integral knowledge of the vast war-fighting asymmetries between actors; 2) security culture within the African Union was pro-interventionist at the time; and 3) Gaddafi signaled genocidal retaliatory intent, which would obligate the international community to intervene.

Introduction

The Allied victory in 1945 heralded the end of an era. The succeeding decades would see the more traditional, conservative war aims of the Napoleonic and WWI/WWII ages give way to those of a more transformative nature, shifting global security culture away from ‘command and conquer’ to ‘intervene and empower’. From this transformation emerged the norm of humanitarian intervention—“any international action primarily motivated by the humanitarian desire to protect civilian targets of state violence” (Kuperman 2008). This perspective, steeped in the guiding principle of the *droit d’ingérence*, or the “right to intervene”, eventually inspired the more formal doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which would become the most significant adjustment to state sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia (Gilbert 2007; Axworthy 2012). At its core, R2P offers United Nations (UN) member states a number of diplomatic—and not-so-diplomatic—avenues through which to coerce oppressive regimes into upholding the values enshrined in the UN Charter, the most radical being the authorization of foreign military intervention in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and/or ethnic cleansing.

Unsurprisingly, intervention under R2P has been met with mixed reviews. Advocates claim that humanitarian intervention is a moral and ethical responsibility and should be undertaken regardless of the potential harm it may pose to the intervener(s) (In Kuperman 2013). Opponents, on the other hand, argue that it disrupts the natural course of conflict resolution making sustainable peace harder to achieve (Luttwak 1999), has the potential to be used by governments as a ‘Trojan horse’ for legitimizing non-consensual intervention (Bellamy 2008), and is a morally, politically, and economically costly strategy that requires significant review (Valentino 2011). Between these two schools of thought, however, lie those who argue that intervention is justified only if it does more good than harm. Achieving such a ‘clean’ intervention is said to be a rare occurrence, however, given that: (1) perpetrators of violence often implement large-scale atroci-

ties faster than the international community's capacity to respond; and (2) the prospect of favorable intervention perversely incentivizes sub-state actors to engage in armed rebellion. The argument in the latter case is that global interventionist security culture has created the background conditions that encourage sub-state actors to engage in rebellion—which typically endangers noncombatants—thereby bringing about the same harm the norm originally sought to alleviate (Kuperman 2013). This dynamic is known as the 'Moral Hazard' (MH) of humanitarian intervention.

In this paper, I examine MH within the context of the 2011 Libyan Uprising by applying it to the strategic battle planning of the National Liberation Army (NLA). Through this, I aim to contribute to the growing body of literature examining MH in Libya (Kuperman 2013b; Kuperman 2013a; Hehir and Murray 2013; Weiss 2011) in hopes of understanding the broader implications of the theory. To guide this analysis, I ask the following research question: does the prospect of favorable humanitarian intervention perversely incentivize sub-state actors to strategically engage in high-risk insurrection?

To answer this, I apply the theoretical argument in a within-case exploratory manner to determine its conceptual applicability. From these examinations, I argue that the prospect of partisan external intervention incentivized the NLA to pursue risky rebellion against Qaddafi's vastly superior state force. This leads the reader to the conclusion that interventionist security culture has played a role in fostering the background conditions that encourage sub-state rebellion. Additionally, the indicators employed to measure the presence of MH establish a model through which it can be examined in future conflict contexts and thus the research has wider theoretical implications.

The first section of the paper examines the theory and implications of the argument on humanitarian intervention, while the second details the methodology and research design employed in the paper and provides three key indicators to guide the analysis. The third section tests these indicators within the context of the 2011 Libyan Uprising and the fourth sums the results.

The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention

Forged in economics theory, the concept of MH first appeared in the seventeenth century to describe fraudulent or immoral behavior in insurance contracts, normally on the part of the insured (Bilkova 2012). In this context, the theory posits that the very nature of the insurance contract encourages risk-taking behavior as the expected costs of that behavior are lowered due to the security guarantee offered by the insurer. Central to this are perverse incentives which stimulate certain undesirable behaviors through promise of reward (Crawford 2005). Thus, the material security provided by the insurance contract is transformed from "a simple tool of positive motivation (a carrot) into the very goal of people's action" (Bilkova 2012).

Applying this framework to humanitarian intervention, Kuperman argues that R2P has produced the same perverse security guarantees for rebel movements and encourages fraudulent and risk-taking behavior. In other words, an expectation of favorable third-party intervention empowers otherwise rationally deterred sub-state groups to take up arms against a dominant state actor. Rebel movements knowingly adopt this 'suicidal' strategy due to an expectation of disproportionate retaliation from the State, which, through media coverage and the CNN effect, compels the international community to intervene on behalf of the 'victims'. This intervention alters the relative bargaining power of the rebel movement, assisting them to achieve their political objectives. In short, the prospect of humanitarian intervention inadvertently produces some high-

intensity violence that would otherwise not occur (Kuperman 2005). Kuperman argues that this was the case in 1998 Kosovo, arguing that discourse surrounding military intervention emboldened the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to use violence in hopes of provoking Serbian reprisals and secure NATO intervention (Kuperman 2008).

Further refined, MH can occur either remotely or proximately. The former refers to the background conditions or “longer term causes” of conflict, while the latter refers to the specific or immediate causes “that trigger the war” (Crawford 2005). As a remote cause, it is argued that interventionist security culture has created the background conditional environment that encourages sub-state risky rebellion. In this case, the moral responsibility for MH lies with those sub-state groups who exploit the prospect of protection because: (1) these groups are better positioned to foresee the direct consequences of their decision to act on the incentive of MH; and (2) they have a greater ability to modify their behavior to adjust those consequences once they are received by the responding actor (Kuperman and Crawford 2006). In this way, external intervention gives rise to violent behavior given that the type and level of retaliation from the state is not only intended and anticipated but also provoked. For the purposes of this paper, the remote cause argument will frame our examination of the NLA’s battle strategy in Libya.

Applying the Argument

To explore the implications of MH in Libya, this paper operates under the assumption that rational deterrence theory guides the decision-making of sub-state actors, arguing that due to massive asymmetries of power, vulnerable groups will typically not rebel due to the logical expectation of failure and the extreme costs associated with it (Bellamy & Williams 2012). Humanitarian intervention, however, alters these probability distributions by promising an increased level of relative bargaining power, thus encouraging rebels to engage vastly superior forces that, under normal circumstances, would not be challenged (Kydd and Straus 2013). In order for this assumption to guide our analysis, sub-state actors must have access to partial or complete information regarding the warfighting capacity of the state. Following from the remote-cause logic and rational deterrence theory, if, with this information present, a rebellion is pursued by a weak actor against a vastly superior state force, it is argued that it is done so with the intention of balancing the equality gap through other means.

In terms of intervention, I also operate under the assumption that an actor’s decisions regarding intervention are made based on their preferences, history, and interests for the future and are a function of (1) their ideological predilection for interventionism; and (2) the overall costs of conflict (Kydd & Straus 2013). In terms of the former point, the palatability of interventionism plays a significant role in the generation of political will for foreign campaigns. Nations and/or regional organizations that ideologically oppose non-consensual intervention will confound efforts to impose the use of force making them unreliable for battle planning at the sub-state level. Humanitarian intervention must be considered a real and tactile possibility by rebel groups in order for them to pursue risky rebellion, preference towards interventionist policy acts as a key indicator for this. For the latter point, states will avoid high-risk military operations if the political, social, and economic costs fail to outweigh the benefits. Thus, to garner public support for a foreign intervention, the benefits must, at the very least, be portrayed to outweigh the costs. One avenue to overcome this dilemma has been to highlight the negative impacts associated with state perpetration of acts that contravene international law. Through these acts, the stability of the international system, and implicitly the national security of the intervening nation(s), is threat-

ened, which raises the expected costs of non-action and heightens the benefits of halting the action. Thus, for moral hazard to exist, the rebellion must be initiated under the expectation that the regime will respond with genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and/or crimes against humanity.

Research Design

Qualitative Methodology

To accurately explore the underlying rationale behind the NLA strategy to engage in armed violence, this paper performs a within-case exploratory examination of MH by operationalizing the three aforementioned indicators separately. For MH to be present, it is argued that all indicators must hold true for the case, as the model predicts that they are conditional. If either indicator is proven untrue or garners weak support, alternative explanations for the decision to pursue violence will hold stronger theoretical validity.

To measure our first indicator regarding the rebel decision to pursue rebellion despite knowledge of the vast asymmetrical power distributions, I compare the operational capacities of both conflict actors and combine this comparison with an evaluation of the rebel's access to information regarding the force capacity of the State. I also explore the temporal linkage between an understanding of the state force capacity and the decision to pursue violence. For MH to exist, the asymmetrical power distribution must have been known to rebel command during the initial stages of the violence. To measure the second indicator regarding interventionist security culture, I turn to Dembinski and Reinold (2011) and Murithi's (2009) examinations of the political preferences of two relevant regional organizations—the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU). The third indicator regarding the expected retaliatory violence from the Qaddafi regime is measured through: (1) an examination of “how the state...traditionally settled disputes on its territory”; and (2) a measurement of the state's public response to “the character, position, and goals of the rebels” (Bilkova 2012). If, by applying these metrics, a sub-state actor could, with some degree of certainty, predict genocidal retaliatory intent, it would theoretically encourage risky behavior (Kuperman 2005).

Case Selection, Time Period, and Data Sources

The 2011 uprising in Libyan was chosen as the exploratory case due to its political and theoretical importance in relation to the emerging doctrine of R2P. Interventionist security culture has been on the rise throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, however the Libyan case represents the first use of R2P to justify humanitarian intervention. Being the first R2P authorized campaign, the impacts and effects of this action hold significant weight for the future of the doctrine. In this paper, a combination of scholarly journals, books, newspaper articles, speeches, intelligence briefs, policy papers, and strategic security reports will provide the qualitative evidence from which the final conclusions will be drawn. The historical timeline employed here ranges from early January 2011, when murmurs of an uprising began to take root in the country, to 17 March 2011 when United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973) was adopted, authorizing international intervention on behalf of the NLA.

The 2011 Libyan Uprising

The Libyan Uprising is believed to have begun in the eastern capital of Benghazi on 15 February 2011 after protestors gathered outside the municipal police headquarters to protest the arrest of

human rights activist Fethi Tarbel. Quickly turning violent, the protestors banded together in a loosely organized political movement and, in line with Egypt and Tunisia's uprisings (Chorin 2012), raised a call to arms on 17 February inciting mass protest against the government of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi. Over the following week, the protest transformed into a full-scale armed uprising as rebel militias began to take control of key eastern cities and high-ranking government officials defected from the Gaddafi regime. Over the first two weeks of the struggle, the rebels decisively routed government forces from eastern Libya, however the advance was to be short lived as the decisively superior loyalist forces began to employ heavy armor, air, naval, and artillery assets (Varun et al. 2011). By 10 March, the back of the rebellion had been broken after a pivotal defeat at Ras Lanuf—a critical staging point from which a final offensive could be launched on the now Eastern rebel stronghold of Benghazi. Following the victory at Ras Lanuf, Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam, publically declared that the rebellion would be “over in 48 hours” (Varun et al. 2011). This was not the case as the very next day the UNSC authorized military intervention to protect the rebels from the incoming loyalist forces.

Operational Capacity

“At the start of the uprising, unclassified sources estimated that the 50,000-man Libyan Army included 25,000 poorly trained conscripts and constituted the bulk of Libya's 76,000 active forces” (Varun et al. 2011). The Army was, by and large, a poorly equipped and weakly trained institution after being deliberately weakened by Qaddafi following an attempted military coup in 1969 (Varun et al. 2011). However, certain elite units, such as the 32nd Reinforced Brigade commanded by Gaddafi's son, Khamis Gaddafi, were seen as personally loyal to the regime and benefitted from much higher levels of training and resources. These elite forces were the regime's primary fighting and protection wings and had access to “the cream of Qaddafi's armories, including T-72 tanks, APCs, BM-21 122mm rocket launchers and...attack helicopters” (Varun et al. 2011).

Additionally, spawning from the personality cult created by Gaddafi himself over his more than 40 years in power, over 40,000 loyalists took the lead in fighting the rebels as Gaddafi's private paramilitary (Varun et al. 2011). These militias were armed by the Libyan government and given access to tanks, artillery, light weaponry, and armed transportation. Furthermore, Ali Zeidan, spokesperson for the Libyan human rights league, claimed there were also “about 25,000 mercenaries operating in Libya” on behalf of the regime (Varun et al. 2011). Overall and despite the relative poor training and lack of equipment, the nearly 150,000-man fighting force was a potent threat.

For the opposition, its weakness originated from its spontaneous creation. The majority of the rebel fighting strength was derived from the Shabab—the “young people whose protests in mid-February sparked the uprising. They ranged from street toughs to university students (many in computer science, engineering, or medicine), and [were] joined by unemployed hipsters, and middle-aged mechanics, merchants, and storekeepers” (Anderson 2011). Supplementing the movement were the defectors from the Libyan Army. These individuals provided the majority of the rebel's military experience, however, their numbers were relatively few. One officer was quoted as saying, “there is no army. It's just us – a few volunteers like me and the Shabab” (Varun et al. 2011). This further weakened the movement as the loosely organized military command structure led to infighting between the top brass.

This reality clearly highlights the large-scale differences in war fighting capability between the rebels and State. For MH to exist however, the NLA would have had to have partial intelligence

regarding Qaddafi's troop strength in advance of the onset of violence. Given Qaddafi's historical use of oppressive tactics and wanton violence in combating opposition movements (addressed below), it is opined that in advance of the rebellion there existed at the very least a general knowledge of Qaddafi's operational capability. Indeed, an outward show of force dominance is integral in effectively coercing popular support within an autocratic system—something that Qaddafi had secured for the better part of four decades. Additionally, due to the large number of defections of high-ranking officers from Qaddafi's forces in the initial stages of the rebellion, the full military capacity of the regime became integrally understood by rebel command. Indeed, the former Minister of Interior—Abdelfattah Younes—defected on 22 February to be named top general of the rebel army only a short five days after the 17 February call to arms (Chorin 2012). These factors combined provide sufficient support for the first indicator.

The Likelihood of Intervention

The second indicator for MH asks whether the NLA could have rationally perceived intervention as a real possibility, and if so, could they rely on the international community to follow-through with it. To explore this dynamic, I situate Libya relative to the interventionist security cultures of the AU and EU—two relevant regional security providing organizations—to explore the extent to which interventionism was a political possibility in Africa.

The African Union's Doctrine of Non-Indifference

The creation of the African Union, as an expression of pan-Africanism, was born from a collaborative realization among African states that they could no longer remain indifferent to the suffering of their neighbors given the fundamental intertwined nature of their peace, security, and well-being (Murithi 2009). As the organization with primary responsibility for the continent's peace and security, the practical implementation of this cultural move required a paradigm shift in African transnational policy that culminated in the doctrine of 'Non-Indifference'. This policy was designed to help nations overcome the traditional hurdles of generating and sustaining the political will to respond to humanitarian crises as a collective. To enforce this, the 2002 AU Constitutive Act enshrined the right to intervene, effectively enabling the AU as the guarantor and protector of the rights of Africans. Additionally, the AU Commission issued the "Strategic Plan and Vision 2004-2007", which highlighted the importance of intervening to promote peace and security as a necessary prerequisite for governance and development (Murithi 2009).

It is clear that the AU's policy of non-indifference was galvanized through a firm positive stance on interventionism. Indeed, during the first week of violence in Libya, the AU Peace and Security Council issued a statement condemning the violence and calling upon the Libyan government to ensure the protection of its citizens. Moreover, following the UNSC adoption of Resolution 1970 on 26 February, which referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, the Council's three African members—South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon—who had previously sided with other African governments in frustrating the ICC proceedings against Al-Bashir—not only did not veto the resolution, but cast an affirmative vote (Hehir and Murray 2013). Given the open stance of the AU regarding continental peace and security, it is plausible that the Libyan rebels could have predicted the AU would respond positively to an interventionist position in reaction to atrocities from the Gaddafi regime. In this way, it is plausible that interventionist security culture in the AU fostered the necessary background conditions to perversely incentivize the NLA.

Security Culture in the EU and the Case of Libya

In the EU however, the NLA would have had less ability to perceive intervention as a real possibility given the EU's preference towards peace-building, conflict prevention, and development as opposed to interventionist policy (Dembinski and Reinold 2011). According to Dembinki and Reinold (2011), this thinking was articulated in EU documents following the World Summit in 2005, where, of note, the primary responsibility to protect was assigned to local actors. Only when states proved unable or unwilling to protect their populations would the onus for protection fall on the UN and regional organizations. This led to the adoption of a somewhat peculiar interpretation of the R2P norm, which emphasized the pillar of the responsibility to prevent and significantly downplayed the military intervention component. The understanding being that 'force should be used in rare and clearly defined circumstances only' (Dembinski and Reinold 2011). This point is particularly interesting given that the threshold for the use of force, as written in R2P, is somewhat ambiguous, offering no clear definition of the circumstances under which states are required to intervene. Bellamy (2008) contends that this can act as a disincentive for rebel groups given that governments have considerable leeway in using force against sub-state actors before R2P is triggered. Despite the merit of this argument, it fails to consider the impact historical tensions play in mobilizing the necessary political will for intervention and lowering the threshold for authorization of use of force.

Given the relative political stability in pre-2011 Libya, the public abandonment of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and the resulting removal of Libya from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, it was easy to forget the long-standing tensions that existed between the Gaddafi regime and the global North. In reality, Qaddafi amassed a deplorable human-rights record since he took power from King Idris in 1969, which, for years, effectively alienated his regime from the international community.

In the early 1970s, Qaddafi established the World Revolutionary Center (WRC) near the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi, which became known as the "Harvard and Yale of a whole generation of African revolutionaries" (Ellis 2001). Questionable characters and groups that defined conflicts for the past 40 years are said to have trained there including Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary Unit Front, the Irish Republican Army, Nicaraguan Sandinistas, the FARC, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and more (Kaplan 2007). Additionally, Qaddafi's regime was implicated in the 1989 bombing of a French passenger jet over Niger in which 171 people perished, and was said to have sponsored the 1986 bombing of a Berlin discotheque (Kaplan 2007). The cherry on the cake came in the form of Qaddafi's WMD program, which began as early as the mid-1970's.

In the late 1990's and early 2000's, Qaddafi changed his tune by renouncing terrorism publicly and abandoning the WMD programs. He handed over two Libyan citizens to be tried in the Hague for their connection to the Pan Am 103 bombing that claimed 270 people and closed all the terrorist training camps on Libyan soil (Kaplan 2007). Despite these positive moves however, Qaddafi never embraced democratic values and Libya continued to rank low on the human rights indices. This resulted in hesitancy on behalf of the West when opening up normal diplomatic relations in 2007.

It is implausible that the NLA rebels were not aware of these existing tensions and even perhaps conceived of portraying Qaddafi as his old tyrannical self by provoking atrocious retaliation. Nevertheless, what is clear is that Qaddafi's history of terrorist support would have made gener-

ating the political will to intervene more palatable to a wider audience as a destabilization of the country may have led to resurgence in terrorist networks.

In sum, the AU's predilection with interventionist policy, coupled with the long-standing tensions held between the West and Qaddafi suggest that the background conditions were ripe to support intervention into Libya.

Genocidal Intent

"Officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches...any Libyan who takes up arms against Libya will be executed" (Bellamy 2011) – Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi

Eerily echoing the Rwandan génocidaires from nearly 20 years earlier, the above quote offers a glimpse into the contempt Qaddafi held for the opposition and signaled the scale of his intended retaliation. Indeed it was this type of rhetoric that led then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to conclude that "left unchecked, Qaddafi will commit unspeakable atrocities" (Patrick 2011). This type of discourse was critical in influencing the Security Council to ratify UNSCR 1970 and 1973, authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya and the use of "all necessary measures" to protect civilians (S/Res/1973 2011, Art. 4) and clearly signaled the international community's perception of some extreme retaliatory intent.

Examining Qaddafi's preferred approach to oppositional dispute settlement offers a glimpse into the rationale behind this type of discourse. The case of Tripoli's Abu Selim prison is of particular importance here. On 29 June 1996, state authorities responded to an inmate revolt by executing more than 1,250 prisoners, many of whom heralded from the eastern cities of Benghazi, Al Beida, and Derna (Chorin 2012). The day before, a prisoner protest calling for improved living conditions quickly turned violent and resulted in the abduction of two prison guards. That same evening, Gaddafi's Head of Internal Security, Abdullah Senussi, personally visited the prison to listen to the demands of the rioters and eventually conceded to their position. The next morning however, "men with machine guns systematically executed most of the inmates" in an operation that lasted roughly two hours and five minutes (Chorin 2012).

This level of violence illustrates the contempt and paranoia Qaddafi held towards dissidents and was not an isolated case, indeed the discourse used in reference to the 2011 Uprising clearly indicated an intention to revive these tactics. In his famous, Zenga Zenga speech, Gaddafi signaled this commitment by saying:

"I and millions will cleanse Libya inch by inch, abode by abode, house by house, alley by alley [zenga zenga], person by person, until you [sic] have cleaned the country from filth and contaminants" (Chorin 2012).

Qaddafi would follow this statement later by committing to "stay[ing]...till the end, dead, alive, victorious; it doesn't matter" (Varun et al. 2011).

Taking the counter position, Kuperman argues that not only did Gaddafi not signal genocidal intent at the beginning of the uprising, he exercised a measure of restraint and did not instigate the initial violence (Kuperman 2013a). For instance, a former high-level military commander in the Libyan Army told a UN inquiry that "only after demonstrators acquired arms did the Qaddafi forces begin using live ammunition" and at first only aimed to wound (Kuperman 2013). Despite

the merit of this argument, it serves to support the hypothesis that the rebellion was initiated with an expectation of genocidal retaliation. Given Qaddafi's past and the type of discourse he chose in the initial stages of the Uprising, the insurgents could rationally predict that Gaddafi would respond the way he eventually did—by firing on unarmed civilian demonstrators, and deploying indiscriminate weaponry in densely populated urban areas (Varun et al. 2011). Therefore, the third indicator for the presence of MH is supported within the case.

Conclusion

From this analysis, it has been shown that the MH argument holds theoretical validity in the 2011 Libyan Uprising. It is concluded that the remote-cause logic of MH, coupled with a background environment conditions favorable to intervention in Libya in particular, perversely incentivized the NLA to pursue violent insurrection. As interventionist security culture takes on a more prominent role in international relations these results have important implications for the future. If, by trying to protect the vulnerable, they are unintentionally put at more risk, thoughtful examination of interventionism must be had and amendments made to R2P to reflect this reality. Further research must be done to hone in on the underlying societal, economic, and political factors that contribute to the MH of humanitarian intervention and be used to inform strategic policy at the highest levels. Only by identifying these drawbacks can the international community define how to intervene in a way that protects civilians in all conflict contexts now and in the future.

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Adopting Provinces: Norway and New Zealand in Afghanistan

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Abstract

This paper examines the strategic use of aid for reconstruction and development (R&D) assistance by the international intervention in Afghanistan. Coalition members carried out R&D projects as part of stabilization operations, to reduce support for the insurgency and build support for the state. Two hypotheses are drawn from the theoretical debate concerning the use of R&D projects for stabilization, and are tested in two provinces, Bamyan and Faryab. Managed by New Zealand and Norway respectively, the study examines how differences in their approach to local ownership contributed to stability. The findings highlight the limitations of local ownership over R&D resources in shaping a stable political environment that is conducive to state-building and development.

Introduction

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) pursued dual military and state-building objectives in its intervention in Afghanistan, launched in 2001 and ending in late 2014. ISAF developed a framework of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), with each PRT being managed by a coalition member responsible for stabilizing their assigned province(s). The PRTs' mission statement is to “assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts” (ISAF 2010, 3). Aid for reconstruction and development¹ (R&D) plays a central role in the strategy laid out by ISAF for PRTs to stabilize their provinces.

The use of R&D projects for stabilization was controversial among coalition members, an ambivalence that is reflected in academic circles. Questions concerning the validity of the theoretical correlation of R&D aid with stability that underpinned ISAF's strategy, as well as ambiguity in the role of the Afghan state, contributed to variations in the practical implementation of the PRT missions by different coalition members. The strategic importance of Afghan state control in the delivery of R&D projects for security and state-building emerged as a point of contention among coalition members. Norway in particular argued that local ownership must be prioritized for state-building, and ultimately, for stability to be possible (Harpviken 2012). With ISAF's intervention having ended and instability continuing to plague Afghanistan, can implications for the theoretical debate be drawn from the variations in stability achieved by different coalition members in their respective provinces?

This paper seeks to contribute to further understanding of the potential impact of R&D projects on stability through a qualitative comparative study of two coalition members' strategies in their respective PRTs. Two hypotheses are drawn from theoretical debates that influenced coalition members' strategies in Afghanistan. The first is derived from the theoretical lynchpin of ISAF's strategy: that R&D projects contribute to stability by reducing support for the insurgency. The second is prompted by the debate on local ownership: whether a greater control for provincial governments over R&D resources contributes to stability by building support for the state.

The study compares the implementation approaches of two coalition members whose provinces were stable at the time they took over: New Zealand in Bamyan and Norway in Faryab. The results of the study highlight the importance of managing the tradeoff between local ownership and efficiency in the strategic use of R&D for stability, with practical and theoretical implications.

¹ “Reconstruction and development”: According to Fukuyama (2006), reconstruction refers to humanitarian response and the rebuilding of infrastructure to return a state to its pre-conflict.

The following section lays out the theoretical framework by examining the theory underlying ISAF's strategy and the debate on local ownership, during which the two hypotheses will be presented. In the research design section, the variables and indicators will be reviewed, as well as the rationale behind the case selection. The cases will then be presented, followed by an analysis section discussing the study's implications for theory and practice of using R&D as a tool for stabilization. The concluding remarks will briefly review the main findings.

Theoretical Framework

Drawn from the PRT Handbook, R&D projects feature in ISAF's strategy as the bridge between military combat and a stable Afghan state, and are the responsibility of the PRT (ISAF 2010). In order to connect the military intervention with the state-building mandate, ISAF created the PRT framework to bring assistance to subnational Afghan governance, with the intention that PRTs would have both 'hard' military and 'soft' civilian capacities (Hynek and Marton 2012). While military operations have been central to the ISAF intervention, 'soft' operations such as R&D were increasingly seen as the most effective weapon in the counter-insurgency (Goodhand and Sedra 2010).

ISAF (2010) suggests two mechanisms by which R&D projects are supposed to contribute to stability. The first is by transferring the population's support away from the insurgency and to the state-building intervention (i.e., both the international forces and the state), which reduces the resources of the insurgency and improves security. The second is to build the capacity of the government to fulfill its functions, through which it will gain support from the population. ISAF's strategy presents the two mechanisms as mutually reinforcing; however, in practice international actors face a tradeoff between the two (Menocal 2013). Each mechanism and the tension between them will be examined in the rest of this section.

Support for the Insurgency

ISAF's strategy in Afghanistan draws from an approach known as 'stabilization'. Stabilization is a "process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development" (U.S. Army qtd. in Gompelman 2011, 64).² At the core of stabilization is the supposition that development and security are mutually reinforcing and can be tactically pursued together in support of a particular political order (Bailey 2011). Theoretically grounding stabilization is the assumption that a population is driven by economic, social, and political grievances to support an insurgency (Egnell 2013). In such contexts, military means alone are insufficient to defeat the insurgency because it can limitlessly draw crucial human, material, and informational resources from the population. If the population's grievances are addressed, it will not support the insurgency, but rather, it will support the intervener and the political structure it pursues. By providing tangible change in the population's quality of life, sometimes called a 'peace dividend', R&D projects can win over the support of the population to prevent it from providing support to the insurgency (Goodhand and Sedra 2010).

While the economic development that is hoped to result from the R&D projects is an important component, it is only part of the causal process. Implementing R&D projects give military forces the opportunity to engage with the local population on positive terms and build political support for the state-building intervention among local elites (ISAF 2010). Some scholars describe it as a political maneuver to shape local power dynamics by directing resource flows to the benefit of local elites who signal their support for the state. Critics go a step further by claiming that the development objective is only a rhetorical cover for buying off local elites (Mac Ginty 2012). Regardless, the impetus of stabilization's approach is to

² There is no consensus on stabilization's definition in the literature, and it is used to denote a variety of initiatives undertaken by states and international interventions in pursuit of stability. Even the literature on stabilization in Afghanistan is inconsistent on what kinds of operations fall under the term. The infrastructure-focused 'Quick Impact Projects' promoted by the US in Afghanistan are often referenced as an example of stabilization operations.

stabilize an area by convincing the population that the state-building intervention offers a more appealing alternative to the insurgency so that it cannot draw resources from the population.

H1: R&D projects will improve stability.

The first hypothesis draws from the proposed mechanism for R&D projects to strengthen security by preventing resource flows from the population to the insurgency. By linking support for the insurgency with security, it examines the mediating factor of the insurgency deriving support from the population.

Building the State

The second method by which PRTs are intended to stabilize their province is by building the capacity of the provincial government. The population's acceptance of the state's monopoly of the use of force is seen as the definitive key to long-term stability and is achieved by the state delivering economic development through the provision of public services (ISAF 2010). The PRT's responsibility is to create enough security for economic development to be possible and to build the state's capacity to deliver public services so that a 'social contract' is formed between the state and the population. In order to achieve this the PRT must collaborate with the provincial government on the delivery of R&D projects (ISAF 2010). This approach is derived from the liberal state-building paradigm, which sees legitimacy as gained by fulfilling the service delivery responsibilities that foster economic development, establishing a social contract with the population. By winning over support for the provincial government's legitimacy to govern – including for the monopoly of force – security improves (Menocal 2013).

However, it is at this point that a tension emerges between the state-building paradigm and the stabilization strategy. In order for the social contract to be formed, many scholars of state-building theory stress the importance of local ownership. They specify the need for R&D projects to be implemented through the state structure in order for its capacity to be built and the results to be attributed to the state. Bypassing the state while implementing public services undermines public perceptions of the state's legitimacy, ultimately weakening "the state and its linkages to society" (Menocal 2013, 393). According to proponents of the state-building approach, stabilization operations are counterproductive when R&D projects are implemented outside the state's control. Even if there are short-term security gains, it is at the expense of long-term stability (Menocal 2013).

The issue of channeling the R&D resources through the state has been highly contested among coalition members as well as academics of stabilization and state-building. ISAF (2010) is vague on the meaning of collaboration with local authorities in that it promotes local ownership but also instructs PRTs to work with other non-state actors to implement R&D projects, claiming that all R&D activities contribute to stability.³ Many coalition members, however, have recognized that in practice they face a choice between prioritizing the state-building objective of their mandate, by channeling funds through their provincial government counterpart, versus maximizing security outcomes by implementing projects directly or with NGOs (Hynek and Marton 2012).

This strategic challenge is compounded by practical incentives to bypass the provincial government in implementing R&D projects. By implementing projects independently, there is more assurance of a quick peace dividend that can render immediate security gains (Menocal 2013). In addition, coalition members have home constituencies that must be assured of the proper and effective use of R&D funds (Hynek and Marton 2012). Angstrom (2008) has pointed out that some coalition members have intentionally bypassed the state as a strategy for force protection, by gaining legitimacy for foreign forces instead of the state.

³ These include other actors in the theatre undertaking R&D activities, including international and local non-governmental organizations, as well as intergovernmental organizations.

In reaction to the ambiguities and even contradictions inherent in the stabilization strategy promoted by ISAF, coalition members have taken different approaches to the issue of collaboration with the provincial government in their PRT. As the causal relationship between security, R&D, and legitimacy remains unclear, the role of local ownership in the stabilization process continues to be of interest to academics and practitioners. In order to contribute to this discourse, the second hypothesis is derived from the debate on local ownership, and suggests that the more control the provincial government has over the R&D projects, the more they will improve stability by building state legitimacy.

H2: The more control the provincial government has over R&D projects, the more stable the province will be.

Research Design

This paper seeks to contribute to further understanding of the potential of R&D projects as a tool for stabilization. The first hypothesis is concerned with whether R&D projects improve security by preventing the insurgency from drawing on support from the population. The independent variable is R&D projects, and the dependent variable is stability. The second hypothesis relates to the PRTs' second objective of state-building, and tests whether local control in the implementation of R&D projects contributes to stability by increasing support for the state. The independent variable is provincial government control of R&D funds, and the dependent variable is stability. The indicators to measure stability will be public perceptions of security, relative levels of violence, violence associated with the insurgency, public support for the insurgency⁴, and public perceptions of the provincial government, national government, and future of Afghanistan.

The sources draw from three surveys of public perceptions carried out by the Asia Foundation (AF), Democracy International (DI), and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE), reports issued by the coalition members, a PRT evaluation in Faryab (Gompelman 2011), one news article, and a number of secondary source analyses published in peer-reviewed journals and books. The public opinion surveys were inconsistent on some data points, which has led to a tendency to rely on secondary sources that conducted field-based interviews.

Case Selection

The two provinces of Bamyan and Faryab were selected for having many similar variables but different outcomes in stability. Both provinces had higher levels of security as compared to other provinces and no insurgent activity at the time the coalition member “took over” the province from ISAF (Hoadley 2012; Gompelman 2011). Bamyan and Faryab both have ethnic minorities as their provincial majority (Donati 2012; Gompelman 2011), similarly poor human development indicators (UNICEF 2012), and similar popular frustration with perceived aid injustice (Hoadley 2012; Gompelman 2011). US was also present in both provinces, undertaking its own R&D projects as well as providing resources to the PRT coalition leader (Harpviken 2012; Hoadley 2012). In addition to aid for R&D, New Zealand and Norway engaged in SSR, providing training for security forces in their provinces in the later years of their presence; both are considered to have performed well in that task (Harpviken 2012; Hoadley 2012; Martinussen, Barstad and Christiansen 2014). Both coalition members have emphasized Afghan ownership of R&D and prioritized the state’s legitimacy; however, they have interpreted this differently in their implementation – particularly regarding direct control of R&D funds (Hoadley 2012; Gompelman 2011). As the cases are two regions within the same country and roughly cover the same period of time, there are many background variables which are controlled for: political events and figures at the national level, national economic policy, military activities of other ISAF members (mainly the U.S.), and the general context of international counter-insurgency and state-building intervention.

⁴ While R&D projects are also meant to decrease insecurity *through* perceptions of socioeconomic improvements, it was not possible to find comparative data to measure this mediating variable.

There is some risk of spillover effects between the two cases. Events in one province can affect decisions and attitudes in the other province, whether at the level of PRT leadership or among the population. There may be some areas that experience more conflict than others as a result of terrain, strategic positioning, and other factors. The study has sought to account for these factors by selecting two provinces with similar levels of security and insurgency presence at the time that the coalition members began operations with their respective PRTs.

Case Studies

New Zealand in Bamyan, 2003 – 2011

In 2003 New Zealand took over the PRT for Bamyan province, an isolated area in central Afghanistan. Throughout the intervention in Afghanistan, Bamyan has been considered the safest province (Hoadley 2012), and New Zealand's management of its PRT has been lauded as exemplary. As a result, it was chosen by ISAF to be the first PRT to close and transition to Afghan control in 2011 (Donati 2012).

The New Zealand PRT has reported hundreds of R&D projects (MoFAT 2013), including building hospitals and schools, training teachers, constructing roads, and developing the agriculture, renewable energy, and tourism sectors. New Zealand integrated the military and civilian components of its PRT, letting security interests guide the use of R&D projects (Stephens 2014). The New Zealand PRT managed to maintain a "consultative and coordinative" relationship with the provincial government (Hoadley 2012, 140), framing their activities as supporting the government while maintaining control of the implementation (MoFAT 2013). Although only a trickle of funds for R&D came from the Afghan government, the Bamyan public perceived it to have been more than half; no respondent even identified New Zealand as a donor (AF 2012). This attests to the success of the New Zealand strategy to bolster the visibility and legitimacy of the provincial government rather than its PRT, despite maintaining direct control of the R&D projects.

Security in Bamyan province remained remarkably stable during the ISAF intervention as compared to the rest of Afghanistan (Stephens 2014). While there is some low-level activity of local militia commanders and drugs trafficking, this has not resulted in alliances with the Taliban insurgency as it has done in other provinces or even in incidents of violence (Hoadley 2012; Zareh 2012). One important factor contributing to security is the population's resentment of the Taliban (AF 2006; AF 2012). Bamyan's population is largely Hazara, a national ethnic minority, who were persecuted and marginalized by the Taliban (Donati 2012). Despite small-scale attacks attributed to the Taliban, which raised concern among the population, perceptions of security have remained significantly higher than the national average and have improved since the first AF survey in 2006, with 91 percent considering the security situation to be excellent or good compared to national average of 74 percent (AF 2012). Her constituents positively view the governor of Bamyan, Dr. Habiba Sarobi, even though the public in general views all levels of government as being affected by corruption (AF 2012).⁵ The number of constituents reporting that 'things are going in the right direction' doubled to 60 percent since the survey began in 2006 with development rather than security as the main concern of the population (AF 2012).

New Zealand appeared to take a strategy of focusing first on humanitarian aid and reconstruction, then transitioning to development once the area was stabilized and the conditions for development were possible. It only worked with the provincial government agencies as they were established, which suggests that their approach entailed waiting for a certain amount of local capacity to be established before beginning to collaborate. Overall, New Zealand's PRT managed to maintain high levels of security in the prov-

⁵ She had the highest approval rating of any Afghan provincial governor of 87%, compared to the average of 51% (DI 2012).

ince and create conditions for development projects to be carried out, thereby achieving the 'stabilization' objective of their mandate.

Norway in Faryab, 2006 – 2012

Norway assumed control of the Faryab PRT in 2006 and withdrew in 2012.⁶ There was no insurgency presence at the time that Norway took over the PRT in 2006 (Harpviken 2012), although there was low-level local violence involving ethnic tensions and local militia commanders (Gompelman 2011). Faryab has an Uzbek majority, which also has poor relations with the Pashtuns, who are associated with both the Taliban and the central government (Ulriksen 2009).

Norway emphasized state control of R&D funds more so than any other coalition member and refused to allow security concerns to guide the use of R&D resources (Harpviken 2012). Its policy was based on the “conviction that Afghan state-building hinges on government control over resources and decisions, and that development priorities informed by security concerns are not effective” (Harpviken 2012, 166). The conducive security environment was used to further justify the prioritization of the 'state-building route' to stability, as it was considered to be 'good' at the time Norway arrived (Harpviken 2012; Ulriksen 2009). Norway also withstood pressure from ISAF to integrate its military and civilian components following the 'integrated mission' model typical of other PRTs (Harpviken 2012).

The Faryab provincial administration is widely perceived as being dominated by ethnic politics, clientelism, and corruption, and existing through patronage with commanders (Gompelman 2011). These patronage relationships mediate the government's access to the population as well as the maintenance of security, and R&D projects are a major resource in this process. While large infrastructure projects have been positively received, public perceptions of R&D in the province highlight the lack of socioeconomic impact, widespread corruption, and failed promises (Gompelman 2011). In his field research in Faryab, Gompelman (2011) found that projects that had been poorly managed by the provincial government had contributed to insecurity, as R&D resources had become a target of elite competition and fueled corruption in the government.⁷

From 2007 the security situation significantly deteriorated as the Taliban insurgency gained a foothold and strengthened links with narcotics producers and commanders (Gompelman 2011). While the Pashtun areas of Faryab acted as infiltration points for the Taliban, poverty and perceptions of poor governance have been cited as the main drivers of insecurity motivating even non-Pashtuns to join the insurgency and criminal groups (Gompelman 2011). Support for the Taliban and perceptions of local insecurity both grew under Norway's tenure (AF 2012). The population is significantly more supportive of the Taliban than in Bamiyan, with less than half believing they are more prosperous since the end of Taliban rule (AF 2012), and 14 percent expressing direct support for the Taliban, on par with the national average (DI 2012). Public perceptions of personal security are worse in Faryab than nationwide; only 38 percent of respondents never or rarely fear for their safety (AF 2012).

The enduring power of the strongmen and the self-serving system of patronage has undermined the legitimacy of the provincial and national government in the eyes of the population (Gompelman 2011). R&D resources are seen by the population as reinforcing this dynamic, such that the unfulfilled potential of R&D has led to disillusionment with the state-building process. While the population has positively received Norway's unobtrusive approach, it was unable to maintain the stability and instead fueled drivers of insecurity.

⁶ In this study, 'Faryab' is considered to include Ghormach district, which became part of Faryab (from a neighboring province) in 2008 (Gompelman 2011).

⁷ Projects that were implemented by NGOs and other international actors, such as the US, were equally considered as being affected by loss to local patronage networks (Gompelman 2011).

Analysis

The comparative outcome has implications for the first hypothesis, which linked R&D with improving security by reducing support for the insurgency. In Bamyan, poverty persists and underdevelopment remains a grievance for the population; however, these issues have not led to support for the insurgency or even to insecurity driven by criminal activity. New Zealand's approach to managing its PRT and R&D projects improved stability, which is evidenced by the relative (and absolute) low levels of violence in the province. In Faryab, on the other hand, Norway's approach to R&D not only failed to improve security as support for the insurgency increased, but amplified political dynamics driving instability in the province. The outcome in Bamyan suggest that R&D projects can improve stability, through a combination of creating the enabling conditions (of security and basic infrastructure) for economic development and building relationships with local actors, including government officials.

This leads to the second hypothesis, which stated that more provincial control over R&D resources would lead to greater stability. The finding of this study, however, points to local control of R&D resources as fueling instability. In attempting to spur the building of the state, Norway instead fueled patronage networks involving the provincial government, amplifying grievances rather than addressing them. Despite Norway's laudable intentions, maximizing local ownership ultimately contributed to destabilization. In Bamyan, New Zealand followed a more moderate stabilization approach of collaborating with the provincial government, and security remained robust. This difference in outcomes suggests that the hypothesis is not valid, as R&D resources can reinforce political, economic, and social grievances from which the insurgency gains support.

A study of R&D projects directly implemented by the U.S. across Afghanistan in a range of security contexts found that they were successful in preventing the spread of violence where it was initially low, but not in reducing it where it was initially high (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2011). As both Bamyan and Faryab had initial low levels of violence, the outcome in Bamyan is consistent with this study. However, the outcome in Faryab, where R&D projects failed to stop the spread of violence, appears to be an outlier. This further highlights the unique dynamic in Faryab in that the provincial government had more control of R&D resources; it would appear that Norway missed the opportunity to stabilize Faryab.

Alternative Explanations

Ethnic homogeneity of Bamyan's population has been noted as an important factor in its stability. The dominant ethnic groups in Faryab also share a legacy of resenting the Taliban, and the presence of a significant Pashtun minority has led to inter-ethnic violence. However, poverty and perceptions of poor governance have allowed the Taliban insurgency to draw support from even the non-Pashtun population. Field research conducted by Gompelman implies that this is driven not by ideological factors, but rather, by poverty, unemployment, and disillusionment with the state (Gompelman 2011). On the other hand, it could be argued that the political competition dogging the Faryab government is prevented in Bamyan by ethnic cohesion, which is strengthened by its homogeneity and narrative of mistreatment by other ethnic groups. Thus, differences in ethnic compositions may account for furnishing the conditions of political competition in which R&D resources would fuel patronage and corruption.

Another possible alternative explanation is the role of the commanders in Faryab. Their position has been strengthened during ISAF's intervention in Afghanistan. Before Norway took control of the PRT, the newly established government and ISAF forces were unable to disarm the commanders and militias (Gompelman 2011). As a result, the patronage networks emerged as a way for political factions to gain power in government, for the government to maintain stability, and the commanders to enrich themselves. While R&D resources exacerbated this dynamic, it existed prior to Norway's arrival. The province was secure in 2006 in terms of relative violence, but another mode of measurement focused on potential destabilizers would suggest that under the surface it was more insecure than analysts recognized. It could be argued that although Norway's approach was not suited to the political reality of its province (perhaps

only recognizable ex post), the theoretical justification for their strategy could still be successful in another context – such as Bamyan.

The issue of civil-military integration has also emerged as significant for the Norwegian case. Norway resisted integrating the military and civilian components in its PRT in the interest of keeping decisions on the R&D funds focused on the state-building objective rather than being subsumed under the security objective. An assessment of Norway's performance in Faryab found that it performed most poorly in meeting those objectives that required both military and civilian assets, which were containing the insurgency and building support for the government (Martinussen, Barstad and Christiansen 2014). This raises the possibility that Norway would have faced additional challenges of internal coordination as compared to other PRTs with genuinely integrated missions. While no data is available to verify the extent to which R&D projects are implemented by private subcontractors, evidence from sources reviewed for this study suggests that a majority of projects are ultimately implemented by a subcontractor, regardless of whether the government, a NGO, or PRT are managing them. It is possible that the lack of integration between Norway's military and civilian components prevented proper monitoring of R&D projects, as compared to other coalition members.

Conclusion

The two provinces, Bamyan and Faryab, were selected based on their many similarities, and, most importantly, their variation in the outcome for the dependent variable of stability. The findings did support the validity of ISAF's strategy of using R&D projects as a tool for stabilization, providing evidence in Bamyan of R&D projects' potential to build the infrastructure and sense of security for the government to form on its own and other actors to carry out development activities. However, the findings challenged ISAF's assumption that all implementation methods contribute to stability. The argument in the state-building literature that bypassing the state in implementing R&D will lead to instability was challenged. Instead, the study found that channeling funds through the state can be counterproductive to state-building and stability. Ultimately, the outcomes highlight the importance of local political dynamics. While it is recognized that stabilization is inherently a political activity and that resources will influence the local political dynamics, providing resources directly to the state does not necessarily increase their power in the way that the stabilization literature assumes.

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